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 Specifying Human Rights
Saladin Meckled-Garcia
Human rights are typically identified under specific headings: the right to life, to secu-
rity of person, to freedom of expression, to freedom from slavery, to due process, and 
so forth. But beyond those headings, notoriously, the trouble starts. What normative 
content the rights have, what they mean, for the right-holder and for others in terms 
of obligations and burdens, is a matter of specification. One could treat this specifica-
tion as a legal question, the interpretation of legal provisions in statutes, prior deci-
sions, or practices. But there is a question in morality that should influence that legal 
specification: what is the morally justified content of any human right? What can hold-
ers of such rights legitimately claim from others and, correspondingly, what morally 
justified burdens does this imply for those others? One school of thought, call it the 
democratic specification tradition, holds that at least in part the specified moral con-
tent of human rights, not just the content of legal rights, must be what a democratic 
political community decides it to be. Specified human rights as moral rights, then, are 
hybrids: inherently moral in the abstract but inherently political in their specification.1
In what follows I challenge the cogency of the key theses of democratic specifica-
tionism on human rights, which I take to be two:
1) Weight-of-Interests thesis: to justify the existence of a moral right a person must 
have an interest that is sufficiently important so as to imply obligations for others 
to secure that interest, and that means interests must be weighed against each 
other to establish their relative importance.
2) Specification thesis: Which interests have the requisite degree of importance 
to become human rights by implying obligations for others is a question that 
must be settled by democratic decision making, where the relative importance 
of different interests (and corresponding costs and burdens) is weighed.
Not all views committed to the specification thesis are explicit about the weight-of-
interests thesis.2 However, that thesis is necessary to give the specification thesis 
enough structure to frame an argument. I will explore, and challenge, both.
1 S. Besson, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Law: Patterns of Mutual Validation and Legitimation’, 
this volume, ch. 15); S. Benhabib, Dignity in Adversity (Cambridge: Polity, 2011). Benhabib takes speci-
fication to be a fundamentally political–legal question: universal claims are specified as different ‘nor-
matively defensible’ (80) legal entitlements, deriving their content and legitimacy from the democratic 
nature of political orders (73ff).
2 eg, Besson, in this volume, holds the first (4) and second theses (5). Benhabib argues that abstract 
human rights can only acquire a concrete content through a process of democratic deliberation, 
Benhabib, Dignity in Adversity, 73ff. However, while she states that human rights justification must pre-
suppose a conception of human needs (65), her argument for democratic specification of moral rights 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Thu Dec 18 2014, NEWGEN
04_9780199688630_Ch-15-19.indd   300 12/18/2014   1:15:31 PM
 Saladin Meckled-Garcia 301
The principal argument offered for the specification thesis is what I shall call ‘contex-
tualism’. This is the idea that whether an interest is sufficiently important so as to ground 
specific duties, and so rights with some normative content, is a matter sensitive to features 
of a social context. Democratic specification theorists take the central feature to be the 
way that members of a democratic society collectively weigh the importance of an interest 
against the burdens required to secure it.3
But there are two possible understandings of contextualism here, objective and sub-
jective. The objective version appeals to different objective features of a context, such 
as scarcity, to justify the need for a different weighing exercise in each different con-
text. But that kind of contextualism in fact relies on clear, pre-contextual, principles to 
establish the priority of any interest. Whether a given tax burden should be borne by 
fellow citizens, for example, in conditions of scarcity will depend on what constitutes 
a fair distribution of benefits and burdens. That in turn depends on what counts as a 
plausible moral principle of fairness, which is not itself a context-sensitive question. 
The views of the political community are not relevant to which, if any, principle is justi-
fied and applies. Objective contextualism, then, does not support the specification the-
sis and in fact undermines it. The subjective version of Contextualism offers a moral 
reason for taking the democratic decisions of the political community to be decisive in 
establishing the relative weight, or importance, of interests. The equal status of citizens 
entitles them to an equal say in that rights-specifying question, and that is a reason to 
take a democratic decision to be decisive. The problem with this argument, however, 
is that it runs together the separate questions of what constitutes political legitimacy 
and what justifies moral rights. What counts as an authoritative decision for a politi-
cal community, a basis for valid law for example, is a wholly different question to what 
is the morally valuable way to prioritize interests. That latter question concerns the 
intrinsic merits of one scheme of priority over another. Moreover, a plausible role for 
human rights standards is to define the limits of acceptable political authority—when, 
for example, even a collective political decision can be judged wrongful enough to fail 
to have legitimacy.
In the last part of the paper I also question the weighing-of-interests thesis and the 
whole weighing metaphor as appropriate for justifying rights, given their special role in 
practical reason.
I. Interests and Well-being
Before considering the two theses just identified, I will clarify some essential terminology. 
The version of the view on which I am focusing is articulated in terms of interests and 
their importance in specifying what a right requires.
An interest, here, is a component of a person’s well-being that can be advanced or 
thwarted, where well-being is understood as the degree to which one successfully pursues 
is not explicitly articulated in terms of weighing interests. See also S. Meckled-Garcia, ‘Which Comes 
First, Democracy or Human Rights?’ Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 
17(6) (2014): 681-688.
3 Besson, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Law’, 5.
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one’s plan of life or conception of the personal good.4 There are conditions under which 
one can better pursue one’s chosen plan of life or one’s conception of the good, which 
is to say conditions under which one enjoys the securing of certain interests. Rights, in 
interest-based views of this kind, represent people’s valid claims to having such condi-
tions secured for specific interests. Enjoying an above survival state of nutrition can be 
seen as a component of a life plan and plausibly improves people’s well-being. A right 
to nutrition would be a valid claim to having certain conditions in place where one can 
achieve some such level of nutrition. It is important to note that burdens corresponding 
to securing an interest also engage interests for the person shouldering the burdens. That 
person could use the effort, time, and resources her burden implies towards pursuing her 
own interests and well-being. A burden or a cost, then, is effectively a thwarted interest. 
So when I go on to discuss weighing of interests, this will often be shorthand for weigh-
ing the importance of interests secured versus the importance of the thwarted interests 
for those shouldering the burdens.
Specifying a right, for the purposes of this paper, means specifying which agents 
have obligations to act so as to secure the conditions associated with a right and 
which burdens they and others must bear. Elsewhere I have argued for a distinction 
between burdens associated with a right and the obligations corresponding to a right.5 
Obligations are just one type of burden or cost corresponding to a specified right. 
Other examples include the opportunity costs that satisfying someone’s claim will 
imply. Burdens of whichever kind must nevertheless be justified if we are to justify the 
specification of a right.
So, if Jane has a right to have a promise kept, then the specification of the right 
provides a means by which one can identify who must act and what burdens oth-
ers (including those who are obliged) must justifiably shoulder. It is sufficient for 
specifying a right that it specifies a type-description of the relevant features that 
pick out duty-bearers. ‘The person that has made a promise’ picks out promise-based 
duty-bearers, and ‘anyone in a position to officially punish me’ might pick out those 
against whom my right to due process is held. By joining together such descriptions 
with facts (Joe made the promise to babysit) we can judge that the right is held against 
Joe, and so that Joe has an obligation to babysit for Jane, and it is justifiable that others 
forego babysitting services from Joe (shouldering those opportunity costs), because 
his time is justifiably occupied babysitting for Jane. However, the specification that 
matters for a theory of rights, and that concerns democratic specification views, is 
clearly the deriving of justified duty-bearer type, duty type, and burden type, descrip-
tions. After all, a concern with weighing interests is motivated by the need for an 
account of which burdens are justified and when rather than predicting for whom 
4 Raz, eg, defines well-being as consisting in ‘a wholehearted and successful pursuit of valuable rela-
tionships and goals’, J. Raz, ‘The Role of Wellbeing’, Philosophical Perspectives, 18(1) (2004): 269–94, 269. 
A  variety of views exist on what constitutes well-being, ranging across accounts based on sensations 
like happiness, desire satisfaction, informed desire satisfaction, needs satisfaction, and ‘objective list’ 
accounts, J. Griffin, Well-being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). What is important to note is that 
different degrees of well-being can be had on all of them, depending on what degree of the relevant object 
(sensations, satisfactions, and objectively listed goods) one achieves.
5 S. Meckled-Garcia, ‘Giving up the Goods: Rethinking the Human Right to Subsistence, Institutional 
Justice, and Imperfect Duties’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 30(1) (2013): 73–87, 79.
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they will be justified. So, the names and addresses of those on whom the obligations 
will fall, as a result of applying such descriptions, is not a question of moral theory but 
rather of its application.
For the purposes of this paper also, I will not consider what makes something into a 
right, as opposed to merely a duty, say.6 Instead I focus on the ‘justification conditions’ 
for any claim specified as a set of burdens for others. That is, how does one show that 
a given rights claim can justify a set of corresponding duties and duty-bearer descrip-
tions from which we might derive concrete judgements? Call that the normative con-
tent of a right.
By democratic specification, in what follows, I will not necessarily mean there has 
to be a full democratic legislative process for every specifying decision. So long as 
legal institutions, including courts, are validated as part of a democratic constitutional 
order their decisions can count as the decisions of a democratic political community. 
Nothing in the following argument turns on whether a demos or a judge decides how 
a right should be specified.
So to restate the democratic specification view, human rights cannot be adequately 
specified such that we know their normative content for a specific social context unless 
we can decide how to ‘weigh’ or ‘balance’ interests, so as to decide which interests 
reach the threshold of ‘sufficient importance’ necessary to imply obligations for oth-
ers. Only a democratic political community can do that, which is to say that whilst 
human rights must be moral rights imposing moral duties, their specification must be 
the result of a political–legal process. Prior to such a democratic process, the content 
of such rights cannot be adequately specified, and so cannot be said to exist as con-
crete entitlements.7 For that reason human rights are inherently moral but also inher-
ently political or legal.
It is worth noting how this contrasts with an interest-based view. Tasioulas, for 
example, concedes that the specification necessary for a right to be ‘claimable’ might 
require a democratic decision or even negotiation.8 However, he rejects the idea that 
the right does not really exist in the absence of such a specification. This is because he 
takes it that we can know an interest to be important enough to justify a right, given 
our knowledge of certain practical considerations (‘the constraints set by human 
capacities, available resources, and general features of social life’).9 Specification is 
needed simply because there are various ways to protect or further an interest, and 
choices have to be made.10 The democratic specification view, on the other hand, holds 
that whether interests are sufficiently important to justify rights is itself a matter to 
6 That is a conceptual question about the meaning of the term ‘right’. ‘Interest theories’ have been 
offered as identifying (categorizing) what is distinctive about rights versus duties say, but in this paper 
I am concerned with views that take rights to be grounded in the weighing of interests, and more specifi-
cally the weighing of interests by a democratic political community.
7 Besson, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Law’, 7.
8 It is ‘an important issue, one to be addressed through further moral and empirical investigation and 
possibly even negotiation or formal determination within the context of democratic politics or judicial 
reasoning’, J. Tasioulas, ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’, in T. Pogge (ed.), Freedom from Poverty as 
a Human Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 94.
9 Tasioulas, ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’, 92.
10 Tasioulas, ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’, 94.
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be settled by democratic institutions. It is unclear how one can know that an inter-
est is important enough to justify a right without knowing the normative content of 
the right, given that ‘important enough’ must mean important enough to justify the 
specific burdens the right will imply for others. Tasioulas assumes that satisfying the 
practical constraints is enough, but without an account of how the specific burdens 
would be justified for those carrying them it is unclear that a claimed right has any 
justified normative content.11 The two views overlap in accepting that (in at least some 
cases for Tasioulas) the normative content of a moral right can be settled by demo-
cratic decisions.12
II. Contextualism
The democratic specification view, as I am construing it, accepts that there are univer-
sal moral rights, and holds that these are based on interests sufficiently important to 
ground moral duties for others. A universal moral right of this kind can be justifiably 
claimed regardless of a person’s institutional membership, as corresponding moral 
obligations can be specified independently of institutional membership. The right to 
have promises kept, for example, is a plausible moral right with corresponding obliga-
tions clearly falling on those who have made promises. By contrast, human rights are, 
on this view, inherently institutional moral rights. That is, they do not exist until they 
have been appropriately ‘recognized’ in a legal order as implying public institutional 
duties.13 When they do exist, however, these duties of public institutions are moral 
duties. The institutional nature of human rights is due to the fact that specifying the 
content of a human right necessarily requires resolving the question of which inter-
ests are of sufficient importance, or fundamental enough, to justify imposing burdens 
on others to secure their enjoyment. On the version of the democratic specification 
view I am considering, that question can only legitimately be decided democratically. 
Members of a political community must decide the threshold of importance by weigh-
ing interests against each other (burdens, or thwarted interests, included), and decid-
ing what constitutes a standard threat from which interests must be protected, and 
what is feasible in securing those interests.14
This would contrast with a view that says human rights can be specified through 
working out a clear moral theory with principles for assigning burdens. On that kind 
of view specification occurs at the level of theory, and is independent of institutional 
decisions. The argument for this view rests on the idea that any specification of human 
rights must be sensitive to a given social context.15
11 Similarly Raz says ‘one may know of the existence of a right and of the reasons for it without know-
ing who is bound by duties based on it or what precisely are these duties’, J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 
184, yet he does think that there are principles of responsibility for working this out.
12 See also appeals to democratic deliberation to settle the content of human rights in J. Griffin, On 
Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 128 and 171.
13 Besson, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Law’, 6; Benhabib, Dignity in Adversity, 65 and 74.
14 Besson, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Law’, 4.
15 Benhabib, Dignity in Adversity, 73, 74, 80, 125, 130; Besson, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional 
Law’, 5.
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Let me spell this argument out. In order to apply a right in a given context, one must 
be able to specify that right. In order to specify a right, one must adjudicate between 
the competing interests present in that context, available agents to act as duty-bearers, 
and feasibility conditions. That is, one must be sensitive to features of this context. 
This means deciding when an interest is sufficiently important so as to justify oth-
ers carrying duties (for example, institutionally imposed duties to pay taxes). This 
raises questions of cost to those carrying the burdens. The view rightly observes that 
to ground a duty for others, one must also take into account the burdens and costs of 
that duty.16
So, the view stresses, interests can be general and important but the kind of impor-
tance that creates moral duties must take into account features of the context. That 
is because the ground for giving rights a clear normative content must be context 
sensitive.17 The right way to ensure that, on this view, is if collective institutions in a 
democratic order make decisions on the relative importance of interests and create 
legal rights that codify this.
On the democratic specification view, then, the correct response to the need for 
contextual sensitivity is to leave that specification to political and legal processes. 
Resolution comes through collective deliberation, decision making, and legality. In 
fact, human rights on such a view do not really have any meaningful normative con-
tent at all without this kind of specification.18 So, the moral nature of human rights is 
partly supplied by considering people’s interests and partly by a democratic political 
order. Human rights are not, then, simply pre-legal moral rights that can be enforced 
through positive law. They are hybrid standards, part moral and part legal, in their 
specification but fully moral in their demands.
There is however a problem with an approach that passes the specification buck, as 
it were, to the political community. The contextualism in question can be understood 
as either objective or subjective. On the objective version, discernible and objective 
features of specific social conditions shape people’s entitlements because they deter-
mine which agents and which burdens are in play. What is relevant are the facts about 
social circumstances that make a moral difference, such as who is in a position to 
take on the burdens, including the duties, and whether it is justifiable that people in 
that kind of position do so. Discerning what matters enough and what kind of bur-
dens can be justly imposed requires a principle that, applied in different contexts and 
together with the facts, will tell us which agent types should bear responsibility and 
why. On the subjective version of Contextualism, on the other hand, how interests are 
compared and weighed to decide whether they ground obligations is a matter decided 
by subjective features: the views of members of the political community.19 This is the 
core contextual feature according to which human rights must be specified and made 
16 Besson, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Law’, 4 and 5.
17 Besson says interests are ‘transhistorical’ but ‘sufficient’ importance and the ‘fundamental’ nature of 
some interests has to be determined by reference to a context, Besson, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional 
Law’, 5.
18 Besson, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Law’, 5.
19 Besson calls this ‘socio-comparative’ recognition of interest importance, ‘Human Rights and 
Constitutional Law’, 5 and 6–7.
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real.20 The only relevant moral principle, then, would be one that says ‘if the political 
community decides to prioritise interests over burdens in a certain way, that is the 
content of human rights’.
The problem is that neither version of Contextualism gives adequate support to 
democratic specificationism. The objective version does not because it actually implies 
appeal to moral principles that are right independently of the decisions of political 
communities and can be used to judge those decisions. It is on the basis of those prin-
ciples that we identify objective features of a social context that matter when judg-
ing what burdens are justified—ie, when specifying the normative content of human 
rights. Whether an interest is important in the right way so that a right should protect 
it will depend on applying principles to the objective facts in a judgement.
Whether a burden is justified, and for whom it is justified, will depend on discern-
ible features about those who might shoulder it, such as being a member of a politi-
cal community capable of treating its members fairly in terms of personal security. 
Those features themselves must be identifiable by reference to principles of justified 
burden for securing others’ interests. On an objective reading of contextualism, then, 
decisions of the political community might get it right or wrong as to what the rel-
evant objective features are, and what duties are justified. They might wrongly prior-
itize Joe’s interests in quashing Jane’s views. This is because they do not define what is 
justified, the principles do. On the subjective version, on the other hand, the relevant 
features of a given context are decisions of the political community about how to pri-
oritize securing interests versus costs to others. I begin by discussion the objective ver-
sion and turn to the subjective version late.
Objective contextualism
Consider an interest such as the interest in nutrition. Should people in a given politi-
cal community have rights to be provided with nutrition? This will depend on what 
securing that interest might mean for others. Securing the conditions for nutrition of 
any degree will imply that others must take on the burdens, such as contributing to the 
nutrition of those who cannot secure it for themselves. It will imply duties on agents in 
a position of authority to allocate burdens, such as allocating tax burdens, and duties 
on productive individuals to contribute through the tax burdens allocated to them. It 
will also imply costs incurred by others resulting from these duties, such as reduced 
opportunities to engage in financial exchanges with those who have been taxed or 
reduced opportunities in their family group when the breadwinners have increased 
allocated tax burdens. Whether these costs are justified by the pressing importance of 
the interests will depend on whether there is a suitable moral principle for justifying 
the allocation of burdens and benefits.
Political theorists have developed theories of distribution for allocating benefits and 
burdens in a society based on concepts of fair distribution or equal opportunities.21 
20 Besson, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Law’—‘Only those interests . . . recognized as socio- 
comparatively equally important by members . . . can . . . give rise to duties’ (5); Benhabib, Dignity in 
Adversity, 64 and 74.
21 S. Meckled-Garcia, ‘Giving up the Goods’, 75–6.
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Such principles indicate when interests are to be prioritized so much that others must 
carry obligations to respond to them. For example, Rawls’ difference principle indi-
cates that persons capable of obtaining unequal advantages should only be socially 
guaranteed those unequal advantages that are necessary for, or coincide with, improv-
ing the position of the least advantaged in society. An alternative view in the literature 
holds that people are entitled to equality of resources, even if ultimately their choices 
lead to different achievements.22 On these views a right like the claim to nutrition 
will imply obligations because of values like fairness and equal concern in a society. 
Fairness might indicate that the advantages of nourished people over un-nourished 
are socially unfair if the nourished can contribute to improving the condition of those 
at the bottom. Their tax burdens in doing so are justified burdens. Equal concern 
might tell us that others’ nutrition must be paid for, say if it is not their choice to be 
under-nourished (as it might be for a person seeking weight loss) but due to society’s 
arbitrary distribution of resources.
The point is that when it comes to deciding on whether interests are to be advanced, 
or burdens shouldered, according to objective features of a social context, we need 
guidance. That guidance, if we are to give a morally satisfactory answer, must take 
the form of a moral principle indicating which interests have the characteristics mak-
ing them important in the right way: rendering the burdens corresponding to secur-
ing them justified. Which means the objective features of a social context that help 
us in specifying people’s rights have to be features picked out by moral judgements 
and moral principles. Consider whether Jane Doe’s interest in freedom of movement 
should matter more than an interest Joe Doe might have in constraining her. Consider 
a principle prescribing that interests in controlling others’ movement for the purpose 
of disadvantaging religious minorities do not count as morally relevant considera-
tions. On that principle Joe’s interest would be ruled irrelevant as a basis for decid-
ing whether to constrain Jane’s movements. On the other hand, if Joe’s interest is in 
having his life protected from assault will represent a sufficiently high priority for 
constraining Jane’s movements when she aims to assault him. Consider the political 
community’s tax burdens in resourcing protection, of Joe from Jane. So long as the 
burdens are fair, on a reasonable account of fairness, Joe’s interests in protection are 
fairly treated by being prioritized. In each case the objectively justified principle will 
indicate the order of priority. What a political community decides is the right balance 
between benefits and burdens, interests and the duties to secure them, is beside the 
point. If it concurs with the objectively right principle the polity gets it right. If it does 
not, it gets it wrong.
It is important at this juncture to further clarify the notion of specification. One 
might say that there are a variety of ways to skin a cat, and similarly a variety of 
arrangements that might prioritize general and fundamental interests. Which social 
arrangements are feasible, and out of the feasible ones which are to be selected and, 
given that different arrangements will fall on different shoulders, on whose shoulders 
should they fall? These are all specification questions. Yet, those questions cannot be 
decided by moral principles given moral principles can only indicate what kinds of 
22 R. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 65ff.
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interests should be prioritized. They do not indicate how to operationalize securing 
those interests.23 For example, securing people’s interests in being free from slavery 
may have priority over the costs to the political community of doing so. But whether 
the police, a special institution, or a militia should do the securing will depend on cir-
cumstances and feasibility.
These questions of policy are rightly questions that a political community must 
decide. However, they have nothing to do with the moral specification of human 
rights. Whether a given police action, a tax scheme to pay for it, or a state’s actions 
in requiring such actions (or all of these) are appropriate specifications of the right to 
be free from slavery will nevertheless depend on principles directing us as to how to 
prioritise the claims of greater security over claims not to have higher tax burdens. 
Which officers are available will depend on morally appropriate contractual condi-
tions in working for the police service. Whether more officers can be employed will 
depend on available tax revenues, and that will depend on the productiveness of a 
given social set up, and what is morally justified in terms of production and the fair 
distribution of its benefits and burdens.
For some aspects of a right, such as the imperative not to enslave others, or not to 
enact legislation permitting such acts, the prioritization will not vary with resources, 
as they are straightforward prohibitions. For others, such as the imperative for a polit-
ical community to protect its members from enslavement, the degree of protection 
will be sensitive to principles for prioritizing different demands, principles of fairness 
in what burdens citizens can be expected to shoulder for example. But in specifying 
the kind of agent that must carry the duty and the kind of duties they must carry, 
appeal to such principles is unavoidable. Whilst their specific application depends on 
objective contextual facts, the correct content of the principles does not. Nor does it 
depend on collective political decisions.
The reason why principled grounds for specification may seem a tall order is that 
human rights theorists have been inattentive to specification. Theorists have sought 
to base their views of justified human rights claims on identifying important inter-
ests. They have interpreted the relevant sense of importance of interests as detachable 
from showing over which burdens an interest has priority, and thus avoided supplying 
clear principles for interest prioritisation, and so for justifying burdens. This is partly 
due to a commonly held view that identifying human rights and specifying their cor-
responding duties are separate enterprises.24 But identifying principles of priority or 
legitimate burden is nevertheless a problem that demands a solution in moral theory, 
and so one that cannot be avoided in offering a theory of human rights with a dis-
cernible practical content. In that enterprise there is no reason to think that a demo-
cratic community is uniquely positioned to ascertain the right principles, as there is 
no reason to think a democratic community uniquely gets moral theory right. The 
crux question is what reasons there are on the merits for adopting one principle and its 
23 cf Tasioulas, ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’ 92, 94 ff..
24 Viz. M. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2006), 277ff; Tasioulas, 
‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’, 93 and 99; A. Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and 
Application (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 15; Griffin, On Human Rights, 97 and 103.
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prioritizing of interests over another. For objective contextualism, then, passing the 
buck to the collective is misconceived.
I am of course assuming here that democratic specification views are not motivated 
by scepticism about moral principles and about moral arguments generally. After all, 
the view seems to presuppose that some elements of human rights decision making, 
such as the selection of relevant interests for weighing which protections are neces-
sary in providing the moral conditions for democracy, are not moral questions we 
should be sceptical about.25 So moving from morality about interests to scepticism 
about how to balance them lacks coherence. An argument would have to be offered 
why in this special case there could be no morally justified theory of priority. Without 
that argument, the sceptical blade that cuts against moral principles would also cut 
against the moral value of having democracy and the point of engaging in balancing 
interests at all. Democratic decisions or the judgement of a court would then amount 
to coin-flipping exercises, with no special moral warrant for their outcomes.
There is a problematic position in the literature that has been highly influential and 
may lie behind this sceptical approach to specification. This originates in a branch 
of German constitutional scholarship.26 It says that constitutional rights (which the 
view does not adequately distinguish from human rights) are not clear principles 
for imposing obligations, but rather instructions to optimise specific interests. Each 
interest represents a heading for a right (life, security of person, freedom from tor-
ture, freedom from slavery, and so forth). In the context of any one political com-
munity, however, the optimization of these interests for any one person will at times 
clash with the optimization for others, and with the collective interests of the political 
community.27 That is why contextual judgement is needed to settle the content of what 
people are entitled to have on a case-by-case basis. Favouring this kind of judgement 
grants courts the authority to balance, and optimize, interests. On one reading of the 
view, there are no moral principles for prioritizing interests, which is the sceptical 
position I mentioned earlier. But as I have said, without a special argument to prevent 
such scepticism infecting all moral appraisals, including our appraisal of democracy 
25 Besson, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Law’, 5; Benhabib, Dignity in Adversity, 60 and 65.
26 Alexy takes constitutional rights to be instructions to optimize interests under their headings, 
and the role of judges in a constitutional democracy to solve the problem of how to optimize in condi-
tions where these rights conflict (where a decision on what gets optimized must be taken), R. Alexy, 
A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2002); R. Alexy, ‘Constitutional 
Rights, Balancing and Rationality’, Ratio Juris, 16 (2003): 131–40. See also K. Moller, ‘Balancing and the 
Structure of Constitutional Rights’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 5(3) (2007): 453–68; M. 
Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice’, 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2 (2004):  574–96. Often the balancing metaphor accom-
panies a conception of ‘proportionality’ as optimizing different interests (especially where collective 
interests are also in play), see:  M. Kumm, ‘Political Liberalism and the Structures of Rights:  On the 
Place and Limits of the Proportionality Requirement’, in S. Paulson and G. Pavlakos (eds.), Law, Rights, 
Discourse: Themes from the Work of Robert Alexy (Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2007); K. Moller, 
‘Proportionality: Challenging the Critics’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 10(3) (2012): 709–31. For a 
critique of the balancing conception of proportionality, see G. Letsas, this volume, ch. 17. Democratic 
specification views are clearly influenced by the idea of legal institutions balancing (or proportionately 
optimizing) interests.
27 Whether or not the collective interests of a political community can reduce to the interests of each 
of its members is a question I shall leave open here.
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itself, that position would be self-defeating. Another reading of this position is to take 
optimization to mean a principle requiring we maximize important interest protec-
tions, and I will return to that in section III. Now I turn to the subjective version of 
contextualism.
Subjective contextualism
One might also think that in conditions where people disagree over what the right 
principles might be, then there is moral warrant for the answer to be settled democrat-
ically.28 This is a moral argument for democratic deliberation. That takes us to the sub-
jective version of contextualism, which offers a moral argument in favour of settling 
interest-weighing disputes by democratic deliberation. This view effectively hones in 
on decisions of the political community as the relevant features of the context that 
decide how interests should be prioritized. For this to count as relevant, then, we need 
a moral argument for making such deliberations decisive. But, as I will show, the most 
plausible moral argument for the decisiveness of democratic deliberation can only 
make it decisive for a different purpose. It can tell us which interpretation of human 
rights a society should adopt for enforcement purposes, all things considered; it can-
not decide the morally right specification of the normative content of human rights.
The moral argument, as offered by democratic specification theorists, is that in a 
democratic context, people are given an equal say in the rights and burdens to be 
socially enforced. This equal say both recognizes that they have interests worthy 
of protection and accords them an equal memberships status in the community.29 
Recognition means giving each an equal say in assessing what that status means, what 
burdens are justifiably imposed in securing each other’s interests.30 The moral value 
behind this idea is the expression of political equality and what this means for distrib-
uting rights to political participation.
But there is a difference between what counts as a legitimate procedure for deciding 
which rights should get socially or legally enforced and the right basis for deciding the 
moral content of human rights. There may indeed be morally good reasons to accept 
collective decisions on what socially guaranteed rights members of a political com-
munity are to enjoy, even decisions that get it wrong within reasonable limits. Where 
there is pervasive moral disagreement in a pluralist society we might need to reason-
ably resolve some debates over society’s rules as a practical necessity, even if those 
debates have not been resolved intellectually, and even if there are some moral ques-
tions for which no one has developed clear and definitive answers. Out of the available 
decision-making processes to move on practically some respect the equal status of 
citizens more than others: democracy respects equal deliberation and input whereas 
28 Viz. ‘Philosophical differences will still persist in articulating the content of such recognition’, 
Benhabib, Dignity in Adversity, 65.
29 Benhabib, Dignity in Adversity, 74; Besson, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Law’, 5, 6, 8.
30 ‘The recognition of human rights is done mutually and not simply vertically and top-down, 
and . . . human rights are not externally promulgated but mutually granted by members of a given politi-
cal community’; ‘it allows for the mutual assessment . . . of the recognition of the corresponding rights 
and duties . . . ’, both Besson, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Law’, 5.
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authoritarianisms do not. Public legal institutions complement this form of respect, as 
they provide a transparent decision-making forum on how legislative decisions should 
be interpreted and their consequences adjudicated. But this is all justifiable as legiti-
mate on the basis of citizen equality (not itself justified by democratic decisions). It is, 
on those grounds a very different project to answering the normative question of what 
moral rights people can legitimately claim regardless of their fellow citizens’ practi-
cally constrained decisions.
It is important to note what is at stake here. Without a special argument shielding 
some rights from having their content democratically decided, the democratic speci-
fication view implies every right, and every element of every right, must be subject to 
interest priority-orderings decided by a political community. There is no exception, 
because any possible practical content that any right could have requires prioritising 
some interests over others. Even something as straightforward as the prohibition on 
slavery implies a priority ordering in terms of the interests of those enslaved versus 
those who might benefit from it.31 As I argued earlier, claiming all moral decisions 
should be subject to democratic practical decisions in this way is self-defeating. It 
implies we have no moral reason to even accept the basic rights that make democracy 
itself possible, giving it some moral warrant. Democratic rights, after all, imply prior-
itizing some interests over others. Note that the version of democratic specification-
ism I have been discussing is indeed committed to a value basis—equal status—that 
justifies the democratic process.32 So, moving to subjective contextualism cannot, on 
this view, be justified by adopting general scepticism about specifying moral rights.
The (non-sceptical) democratic specification solution, then, only makes sense if it 
serves some value that is also part of the initial impetus to develop an account of 
human rights. As I have shown, one such value is giving people an equal say and an 
equal status in their collective institutions, to thereby respect their equal moral sta-
tus.33 That value is perfectly well served by accepting a fundamental role for demo-
cratic institutions, plus judicial propriety, in practical decision making. However, as 
also argued, what makes a correct form of practical decision making is not the same 
as what makes a correct moral decision, otherwise democratic decisions could not 
themselves have any moral warrant. Correct practical decision making is simply mor-
ally justified decision making under specific constraints, such as having processes that 
respect all members of the political community equally.
The same candidate value is also an excellent candidate for underpinning a view 
about the right way to prioritise interests. This is the value of treating people in a way 
that shows equal respect for their status and equal concern for the way their lives will 
fare in the face of non-optional collective institutions. But if that is the point of the 
enterprise, it is not well served by claiming the morally justified content of the values, 
31 For those uncomfortable with describing a preference for torture, either instrumental or intrinsic, 
as just another interest in a priority ordering this section can be phrased in terms of preferences that 
should be discounted. We still need a principle that sets out criteria for which those are.
32 See n 30.
33 Viz. ‘ . . . the threshold of importance and point of passage from a general and fundamental interest 
to a human right . . . may be found in the normative status of each individual qua equal member of the 
moral-political community’, Besson, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Law’, 5.
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of equal respect and concern, is a matter for practical decision-making procedures. 
That value must inform us in determining which practical decision-making proce-
dures are legitimate and the extent, and the limits of, their legitimacy. That is why slav-
ery, even if it were underwritten through a majoritarian ‘democratic’ process could 
never represent a rightful prioritizing of interests, nor could absence of due process, 
or general suppression of dissenting political speech and associations. Which is to say 
that some decisions can be so wrong that they are illegitimate regardless of the con-
straints under which they are made, even if it is normally reasonable to decide matters 
democratically under such constraints. For other rights, such as those seeking to best 
express equal mutual concern for members of a political community, there might be 
leeway under these constraints to allow us to implement what is not the morally right 
solution on the merits, but the right on the merits of the decision-making procedure.
Of course, democratic specificationism is motivated by a desire to establish which 
interests should be prioritized and the apparent difficulty in pure moral theory of 
doing so. One reason that apparent difficulty is the kind of moral theory such views 
appeal to in trying to explain moral rights—interest-based accounts looking to estab-
lish the priority of interests by ‘weighing’ how important their fulfillment is for each 
person’s well-being. There are inherent problems with that theoretical framework that 
underpin specification problems, as I show in section III.
III. Weight-of-interests
The weighing-of-interests component of the view, as I have construed it here, is not 
specific to democratic specification theories. However, it gives some structure to the 
democratic specification argument.34 Nevertheless, the view that rights must be justi-
fied by reference to the relative importance (weight) of interests is a widely held view. 
There are, however, two possible readings of the idea that an interest has ‘sufficient 
importance’ (is of sufficient weight) such that it grounds obligations. The reading that 
the democratic specification approach needs, however, is the less plausible of the two.
On the first reading, the importance of an interest is in terms of its importance for 
a person’s well-being. For example it is usually highly important for a person to enjoy 
even minimal well-being that such interests as water, food, freedom from attack, and 
so forth, are secured. On the second understanding of importance, securing an inter-
est is important by reference to some moral value, such that prioritizing this interest 
realizes that value and failing to prioritize it does not, or even runs counter to it. So, 
equal pay for equal work is more in line with the value of fairness than random pay 
for equal work. The additional pay a person in the random pay system might get in 
the equal pay system might be of marginal importance to her well-being, given her 
life aims. More pay may not alter the well-being of someone whose life satisfaction is 
focused on her work. Yet the distribution is hugely important for fairness.
The democratic specification view needs the first sense of importance. The view says 
a political community must deliberate under conditions of equality in order to weigh 
34 ‘Of course, there has to be a threshold of importance at which a given interest is regarded as sufficiently 
fundamental to give rise to duties and hence to a right’, Besson, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Law’.
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how important, or fundamental, interests are. That weighing (or ‘balancing’) results in 
decisions as to the importance of interests and what the threshold of importance is for 
grounding duties. If an interest in increased personal security for Paul has sufficiently 
greater weight than Peter’s interest in avoiding increased taxation, this will justify 
duties to pay more taxes. But for any scheme proposing decisions about obligations on 
the basis of weighing the importance of interests, there has to be a common currency 
of importance in terms of which the interests are compared.
I am assuming the only relevant common currency here is the importance of inter-
ests to people’s well-being. Yet, however important an interest is in that sense, that 
fact is not even a prima facie ground for moral obligations. That is because ground-
ing duties for others requires an account of when, and why, those others must pri-
oritize Paul’s interest over their own in pursuing their own lives as they wish. In 
other words it requires a third factor: an account of when an interest is of overriding 
importance: when it demands that we override the interests others have in not being 
burdened.
For any two interests, if they are interests of the same person it makes perfect sense 
that, when deciding which she has reason to act to secure, she has most reason to 
choose the interest that matters to her the most in the scheme of her aims and overall 
conception of the good. That is a key aspect of well-being and its value—the degree to 
which someone gets to pursue her conception of the good. But things are different if 
these interests belong to different persons. While an interest might be of high impor-
tance to Paul, that is not by itself a reason for Peter to prioritize securing that interest, 
given securing his own interests will be important for him too. Peter needs a reason 
to prioritize securing Paul’s interest over those of his interests thwarted by taking on 
these burdens. But the fact that Paul’s interest is important to his well-being is not the 
right kind of reason.
What is needed is a value-based reason: a reason for Peter to value prioritizing the 
securing of another’s interest over his own. And that reason must guide Peter as to 
how much priority he should give the interests of others, given he has interests of 
his own. The same structure of reasoning applies to the social case as using social 
resources such as taxes implies tax burdens for people and so calls for a justification 
for prioritizing others’ interest over our own burdens. This is why human rights theo-
rists often appeal to moral values such as dignity or minimal decency, to justify plac-
ing priority on securing a minimal list of interests. One could also appeal to values 
like fairness, which on one view means the interests of the least advantaged are prior-
itized over those of the most advantaged. It is fair that those inequalities enjoyed by 
those who can achieve them because of social cooperation are taxed for the sake of 
those not otherwise in a position to benefit so much from that cooperation.
So the first reading of importance, as simply importance for a person’s well-being, 
will not get us to human rights (moral reasons to act in ways that are beneficial to 
some and burdensome to others). We need a moral value, perhaps expressed as a 
moral principle, like fairness or respect, and that is the second reading of the notion 
of importance.
On this reading, importance is priority in terms of serving a moral value. But note 
that this priority is not of the kind involved in balancing and weighing. A right, as a 
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type of practical reason, must be able to silence some considerations, including other 
interests. Consider a version of the earlier example where someone’s conception of the 
good involves dedication to a discriminatory religious view. A worshiper might have 
an interest, as a result of pursing a life of dedication, in discriminating against other 
religions. The holder of such a view might claim a right to discriminate. The correct 
response to such a claim is not that non-discrimination is sufficiently important to 
others, in terms of some value like fairness or dignity, that it outweighs the importance 
of the devotee’s interest in discriminating in terms of fairness or dignity.35 Rather, the 
correct response is that her interest does not even count as a relevant consideration. 
It automatically gets a weighting of zero in all equations. The moral priority of rights, 
then, is a more complex form than the weight-of-interest-importance view suggests.
There is one candidate for a moral value that would seem to instruct us to look at 
how much securing interests contributes to a person’s well-being. That is any moral 
view that values actions maximizing well-being, because more protected well-being 
is better than less.36 An example of this would be a kind of ‘interest calculus’ where 
securing an interest is prioritized if it produces an overall gain in well-being.37 On that 
kind of view, we are indeed required to weigh interests against each other in terms of 
their contribution to well-being, but we must then consider them in the aggregate to 
decide what duties they ground. An interest deserves securing on this view if it con-
tributes to a higher sum of secured interests. Whilst this is indeed a candidate for the 
second interpretation of importance, it is unfortunately retrogressive as an account 
of human rights. It implies that individual-centred concerns are beside the point, and 
an individual’s plight only matters enough to ground rights when it contributes to the 
common good. If not fully a utilitarian view, this is open to similar objections to such 
views, based on the intrinsic importance and value of individual destinies.
In summary, there are significant problems with the weight-of-interests view that 
frames the prioritization problem to which the democratic specification approach is 
supposed to resolve. A challenge to that framework is the idea that we sometimes pri-
oritise some interests over others, and impose some burdens as a result, not because of 
their respective contributions to well-being but because doing so serves a moral value 
such as equal respect. I sketch the beginnings of such a view elsewhere.38
35 I  am here emphasizing the capacity of rights to block other considerations or ‘reasons’. Other 
authors have stressed this characteristic of moral rights, see R. Dworkin, ‘Taking Rights Seriously’, in 
his Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978); J. Waldron, ‘Pildes on 
Dworkin’s Theory of Rights’, The Journal of Legal Studies, 29(1) (2000): 301-207, 305; Meckled-Garcia, 
‘Giving up the Goods’, 83ff.
36 This will include different views on maximization, such as straight aggregate increase and pareto 
improvement.
37 Another example, proposed by Marmor, is an ‘interest calculus’ (a ‘cost-benefit analysis’) to decide 
what burdens are justified in terms of maximizing overall interest protection, A. Marmor, ‘On the Limits 
of Rights’, Law and Philosophy, 16(1) (1997): 1–18, 10ff, yet he eschews the idea that this implies any kind 
of utilitarian calculus, because utilitarian calculi require ‘quantitative commensurability’ of interests. 
Whether that is sufficient to separate this form of aggregation from utilitarianism, I shall leave aside here. 
It is nevertheless a consequentialist view of rights, given what is required as a matter of right is decided 
by its consequences for the interest calculus (although I note that Marmor claims his view is not conse-
quentialist, ‘On the Limits of Rights’, 14).
38 S. Meckled-Garcia, ‘Giving up the Goods’.
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IV. Conclusion
In conclusion I  have offered some reasons for doubting the cogency of the specifi-
cation thesis and the weighing-of-interests thesis. This challenges versions of demo-
cratic specification subscribing to either or both theses. I hope also to have given some 
general reasons to re-consider the idea that human rights can be grounded in the 
weighing of interest, in terms of their importance for well-being. This is not a scepti-
cal challenge to human rights, as there are candidate accounts of human rights that do 
not suffer from the problems of well-being-based accounts.
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